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From junta to crisis: modernization, consumerism and cultural 
dualisms in Greece* 
 
Dimitris Tziovas 
University of Birmingham 
d.p.tziovas@bham.ac.uk 
 
The Greek economic crisis has triggered a self-reflexive process and prompted a re-
examination of political and cultural trends in Greece since 1974 in an attempt to rethink 
earlier cultural approaches and practices. This article argues that a cultural perspective 
on the crisis can be productive insofar as it revisits key concepts and dominant models of 
analysis and charts cultural change in Greece from the fall of the military junta in 1974 
to the beginning of the crisis in 2009. Just as the fall of the junta encouraged a re-
examination of the post-civil-war period, so the current economic crisis has prompted a 
rethink of the metapolitefsi era. Exploring the cultural developments that have taken 
place during this period, this article focuses on competing notions of culture and engages 
with the two dreams of the post-junta period: modernization and consumerism. The aim 
is not to reaffirm oppositions or reverse hierarchies but to rethink cultural dualisms and 
explore hybrid tensions within a broader political and cultural context. 
Keywords: Greek junta; Greek crisis; modernization; consumerism; cultural dualism 
 
A number of studies on post-1974 Greece published in recent years, and even earlier, 
have focused on political, economic or institutional changes, but cultural developments 
do not seem to have received adequate scholarly attention.
1
 Even those books which 
include chapters or sections on culture tend to offer surveys of specific areas rather than 
                                                          
* This work was supported by the Arts and Humanities Research Council [grant number AH/L01498X/1]. 
1
 Y. Voulgaris, Η Ελλάδα της Μεταπολίτευσης 1974-1990 (Athens 2001) and Η Μεταπολιτευτική Ελλάδα 
1974-2009 (Athens 2013), S. Kalyvas, G. Pagoulatos and H. Tsoukas (eds), From Stagnation to Forced 
Adjustment: Reforms in Greece, 1974-2010 (Oxford 2013), M. Avgeridis, E. Gazi, and K. Kornetis (eds), 
Μεταπολίτευση: Η Ελλάδα στο μεταίχμιο δύο αιώνων (Athens 2015). In recent novels, Theodoros 
Grigoriadis has tried to capture the 1980s (Ζωή μεθόρια, Athens 2015, and Το Παρτάλι, Athens 2001) and 
the period of the crisis (Το μυστικό της Έλλης, Athens 2012), thus fictionalizing the transition from junta to 
crisis.  
2 
 
2 
 
trying to capture and analyse more general cultural trends.
2
 The Greek economic crisis 
has triggered a self-reflexive process and prompted a re-examination of political and 
cultural trends in Greece since 1974 in an attempt to rethink earlier cultural practices and 
answer questions such as the extent to which a cultural approach can help us understand 
the political and economic aspects of this crisis, and whether the crisis frames old issues 
in a new perspective, encouraging a more critical approach. The answers to such 
questions are neither easy nor straightforward. Just as the fall of the junta encouraged a 
re-examination of the post-civil-war period, so the current economic crisis has prompted 
a rethink of the metapolitefsi period. It has fostered a re-reading and retrospective 
criticism of the post-dictatorship transition to democracy and led to the current 
difficulties being seen as a result of clientelism, corruption and failed modernization. The 
country’s post-1974 period has been turned into an interpretative framework and is often 
blamed for the troubled present and an uncertain future.
3
 However, looking at this period 
(1974–2009) from a cultural perspective may offer alternative paradigms and be 
productive by revisiting dominant models of analysis and charting cultural change in 
Greece.  
   Exploring the cultural developments that have taken place since the fall of the junta, 
this article will focus on two crucial and interconnected areas, namely the discussion of 
various manifestations of dualism as a method of cultural analysis and the increasing 
tension between humanist and consumerist cultural practices.
 4
  The first part of this 
article interrogates the ways in which dualism has been deployed by a range of scholars 
to assess the extent of Greece’s modernization and how it has developed into a dominant 
transdisciplinary method of analysis since the 1980s. Culture in this part is discussed 
within a wider historical and political context. The second part looks at increasingly 
competing conceptions of culture in the period from junta to crisis and highlights the 
implications of the growing trend towards popular and material culture.
5
 Although both 
parts deal with the coexistence of two competing cultural discourses and engage 
                                                          
2
 V. Panagiotopoulos (ed.), Ιστορία του Νέου Ελληνισμού – Η Ελλάδα της ομαλότητας, 1974-2000 (Athens 
2003). 
3
 A. Liakos and H. Kouki, ‘Narrating the story of a failed national transition: Discourses on the Greek 
crisis, 2010–2014’, Historein 15 (2015) 53. 
4
 Consumerism is defined here as a cultural ideology highlighting consumption, lifestyle and material 
culture. 
5
 This trend might not be particular to Greece and it is likely to have occurred earlier or at the same time in 
other countries. What could be considered as making the difference in the case of Greece is the rapid pace 
of change, and this cannot always serve as a reliable measure of comparison due to the differing political 
and socio-cultural conditions within each country. 
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respectively with the two dreams of the metapolitefsi: modernization and consumerism, 
the aim is not to reaffirm oppositions or reverse hierarchies but to explore hybrid tensions 
and cultural ambivalences. 
 
Dualisms and the role of the state: Modernization, hybridization and cultural 
ambivalence  
 
One of the most enduring and influential interpretations of Greek cultural and political 
developments advanced during the metapolitefsi is that of cultural dualism, which is 
based on the assumption that two opposing trends or forces are vying for supremacy. 
Greek culture, like Greek identity, has been seen from a dualist perspective, marked by 
symbolic oppositions or tensions. This approach has been adopted in different forms by 
anthropologists, political scientists and historians and has framed the discussions of 
political and cultural developments in Greece since the 1980s.
6
  
 In the 1980s, building on Patrick Leigh Fermor’s schema regarding the ‘Helleno-
Romaic dilemma’, the anthropologist Michael Herzfeld proposed the Hellenic-Romeic 
distinction as ‘the difference between an outward-directed conformity to international 
expectations about the national image and an inward-looking self-critical collective 
appraisal’.7 Although Herzfeld has been keen to challenge two-column diagrams (such as 
the one used by Leigh Fermor) as a European product, he introduced the concept of 
disemia to argue that Greek identity is caught between two extremes. He suggested that 
the Hellenic and Romeic, or ‘outside’ and ‘inside’, views of Greek culture, are the two 
historical images informing the respective ideals of self-presentation and self-knowledge 
(or self-recognition) while Korais and Zorba compete for the Greek soul.
8
  
 In the early 1990s the political scientist Nikiforos Diamandouros explored the 
relationship between culture and politics in Greece and charted the evolution of two 
cultures, which held sway alternately according to political circumstances.
9
 The older of 
                                                          
6
 For a review of some of the discussions, see I. Katsoulis, ‘Η Νεοελληνική κοινωνία: “μεταξύ” 
εκσυγχρονισμού και παράδοσης’, The Books’ Journal 73 (January 2017) 14-23. 
7
 M. Herzfeld, Ours Once More: Folklore, Ideology, and the Making of Modern Greece (New York 1986 
[1
st
 edn 1982]) 20. 
8
 M. Herzfeld, Anthropology Through the Looking-glass: Critical Ethnography in the Margins of Europe 
(Cambridge 1987) 95–122. 
9
  N. P. Diamandouros, ‘Politics and culture in Greece, 1974–1991’, in R. Clogg (ed.), Greece, 1981–1989: 
The Populist Decade (New York 1994) 125, ‘Cultural dualism and political change in postauthoritarian 
Greece’, in Estudios = Working papers/Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones, Centro de 
Estudios Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales 50 (Madrid 1994), available at http://digital.march.es/ceacs-
ir/es/fedora/repository/ir%3A3835, and Πολιτισμικός δυισμός και πολιτική αλλαγή στην Ελλάδα της 
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these two, the underdog culture, has been seen as marked by a pronounced introversion, 
xenophobia, anti-westernism, and adherence to pre-capitalist practices.
10
 Defined by 
Diamandouros in a somewhat contradictory manner as combining a potent egalitarianism 
with a pre-democratic mentality, this culture competes with its younger counterpart, 
which has its intellectual roots in the Enlightenment and liberalism. It is also claimed that 
this modernizing and reformist culture, ‘outward-looking and less parochial than its 
rival’, was in the ascendant in the Greek world from the second half of the nineteenth 
century until the early to mid-1930s. From then on, until the mid-1970s, it entered a 
period of decline, following the decline of the diaspora communities and the exhaustion 
of the Venizelist project. However, according to Diamandouros, what might have tipped 
the balance in favour of this culture was Greece’s increasing integration into the 
European Union.  
 More than ten years later the historians John Koliopoulos and Thanos Veremis 
adopted a different, but essentially similar, binary opposition, using Ernest Gellner’s 
concept of the ‘segmentary society’, which refers to a pre-modern social structure 
intended to protect the extended family and and prevent the authorities from encroaching 
on its power.
11
 They saw the traditional, segmentary society as a deep structure, resisting 
the unifying impetus of the modern unitary state, which antagonized domestic political 
practices by adopting western principles of governance. This opposition contrasts the 
traditional and pre-modern segmentary society, broadly associated with the East, with the 
civil society and western models of administration (which in the case of Greece were 
championed by diaspora and modernizing elites including the statesmen Kapodistrias, 
Mavrokordatos, Trikoupis, Venizelos).
12
 In short, the segmentary society and underdog 
culture are perceived as impediments to modernization.  
                                                                                                                                                                            
Μεταπολίτευσης (Athens 2000). With reference to PASOK and from a leftist perspective, Euclid Tsakalotos 
attempts a critique of Diamandouros’ dualism: ‘Modernization and centre-left dilemmas in Greece: The 
revenge of the underdogs’, GreeSE Paper no 13, Hellenic Observatory Papers on Greece and Southeast 
Europe, April 2008, available at 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/europeanInstitute/research/hellenicObservatory/pdf/GreeSE/GreeSE13.pdf. 
10
 Nicos P. Mouzelis specifies two distinct types of the underdog culture, the clientelistic, dominant in the 
pre-junta period, and the populist, dominant in the post junta period: ‘Greece in the twenty-first century: 
Institutions and political culture’, in D. Constas and Th. G. Stavrou (eds), Greece Prepares for the Twenty-
first Century (Washington, DC 1995) 17-34.  
11
 J. S. Koliopoulos and Th. M. Veremis, Modern Greece: A History since 1821 (Oxford 2010). 
12
 Th.Veremis, ‘Όταν η κατακερματισμένη κοινωνία συναντά τον λαϊκισμό’, Protagon, 9 December 2011: 
http://www.protagon.gr/?i=protagon.el.article&id=10772 (accessed 25 May 2016) . See also his lecture 
‘The Greek crisis: When the segmentary community meets with populism’ (The Hellenic Centre, London, 
1 June 2013: http://www.livemedia.com/video/45135). It is interesting to note that Andreas Papandreou, 
who spent a number of years teaching in America and Europe, is not included among those whom Veremis 
calls ‘diaspora statesmen’. 
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 Cultural and political dualism, in its various forms, has emerged as the dominant 
model of and for the post-junta period but also for the earlier history of Greece. My aim 
here is to show its inadequacies as an interpretive methodology and question its 
evaluative implications and political uses. A cultural perspective can help us to reassess 
the operation of this dualism from the point of view of the underdog culture rather than 
that of the elitist modernizing culture. This, in turn, might shift attention from 
demarcating the discourses of the two cultures or confirming the superiority of one over 
the other in articulating subject positions to highlighting the instability and hybridity 
involved in constructing cultural identities. Greeks, for example, may simultaneously 
admire and hate anything associated with modern Europe. They aspire to be western 
while at the same time looking down on Northern Europeans, saying: ‘when we were 
building the Parthenon, you were living in the trees’ in the same way as they treat their 
‘homeland’ as a ‘whore’ and a ‘Madonna’.13 
  Recently, the cultural dualism proposed by Diamandouros has been revisited
14
 
and the ‘underdog’ culture blamed ‘for bringing the country to the verge of economic and 
political bankruptcy’.15 This culture has been presented and understood as being at the 
root of Greece’s debt crisis and of the country’s inability to address its structural 
shortcomings.
16
 Despite occasional reservations, this dualism continues to inform the 
way Greek identity is analysed and Greece is presented as poised between a troubled 
tradition and a desired modernity. Trying to demarcate the two trends, the exponents of 
the dualist approach aim to highlight binary oppositions while its critics tend to 
emphasize their fusion.
17
 Instances of hybridization have been explored, a good example 
being the fusion of the two clashing modes of time. The ‘pre-modern’ mode of cyclical 
and ritual time embodied in the celebration of name days now co-exists with an 
increasing awareness of the irreversible and linear time associated with birthdays. 
Nowadays an increasing number of people in Greece celebrate both, whereas in the past 
the celebration of name days was more prevalent.
18
 Critiquing the rigidity of the dualist 
                                                          
13
 It is interesting that Ellinismos (i.e. the Greek nation) is often perceived both in terms of great 
achievement and bare survival. 
14
 N. P. Diamandouros, ‘Postscript: Cultural dualism revisited’, in A. Triandafyllidou, R. Gropas and H. 
Kouki (eds), The Greek Crisis and European Modernity (Basingstoke 2013) 208-32. 
15
 A. Triandafyllidou, R. Gropas, and H, Kouki (eds), The Greek Crisis and European Modernity, 9 and 15. 
16
 Triandafyllidou, Gropas, and Kouki, 8. 
17
 On hybridity and a critique of the dualist approach, see D. Tziovas, ‘Beyond the Acropolis: Rethinking 
Neohellenism’, Journal of Modern Greek Studies 19 (2001) 189–220. 
18
 R. Hirschon, ‘Cultural mismatches: Greek concepts of time, personal identity and authority in the context 
of Europe’, in K. Featherstone (ed.), Europe in Modern Greek History (London 2014) 164–5 and D. 
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approach by highlighting cases of hybridization or demonstrating how an individual-
centred culture co-exists with an earlier collectivist mentality is not sufficient. What is 
missing here is a historical and to some extent a cultural perspective, although the 
defenders of the dualist approach will argue otherwise.   
 The resilience of the dualist approach as a useful analytical tool has something to 
do with the fact that the notion of modernization, in the sense of ‘catching up with 
Europe’, has increasingly entered debates on national identity as representing a break 
with the vestiges of the country’s ‘Ottoman’ and ‘oriental’ past. Cultural dualism, as 
outlined above, involves a form of Eurocentrism which has been indicted by postcolonial 
theorists studying former colonies in south Asia. Postcolonial theory reflects a desire to 
avoid Eurocentrism by provincializing Europe
19
 and the need to understand the 
importance of local cultural categories, practices and identities. The underdog culture 
could be seen in terms of the ‘subaltern’ (the under-represented in India’s history and 
their hidden history) and the classic question ‘Can the subaltern speak?’ could be applied 
to it.
20
 As with the subaltern, whose identity is its difference, one cannot construct the 
underdog culture as a category with ‘an effective voice clearly and unproblematically 
identifiable as such’.21 Yet until now the emphasis by those practising cultural dualism 
has been on the modernizing culture and its transformative potential, while little attention 
has been given to the underdog culture. 
  The dualist approach tends to boil everything down to an underlying opposition 
between East and West by tacitly valorizing the West and ignoring the negative aspects 
of western modernity. However, what is not acknowledged here is that the westernizing 
trend has always had the upper hand, not expressed in the form of a modern polity or 
civil society, but as a centralizing state mechanism suppressing cultural diversity. In 
Greece the state represented an authoritarian caricature of western modernity and kept 
any manifestations of the underdog culture or the segmentary society under control, both 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Tziovas, The Other Self: Selfhood and Society in Modern Greek Fiction (Lanham, MD 2003) 13–29. On 
the Greek notion of time, see S. Ramphos, Time Out: Η ελληνική αίσθηση του χρόνου (Athens 2012). 
19
 D. Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton 
2000). 
20
 In the South Asian context, the term ‘subaltern’ applies to all groups that are perceived as ‘subordinate’ 
in terms of class, caste, gender, office or ‘in any other way’. See G. C. Spivak, ‘Can the subaltern speak?’, 
in G. Nelson and L. Grossberg (eds), Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture (Urbana 1998) 271-313,  
R. Guha and G. C. Spivak, Selected Subaltern Studies (Oxford 1988), S. Morton, Gayatri Spivak: Ethics, 
Subalternity and the Critique of Postcolonial Reason (Cambridge 2007) 96-7. 
21
 B. Ashcroft, G. Griffiths, and H. Tiffin, Post-Colonial Studies: The Key Concepts (London and New 
York 2007) 201. 
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culturally and politically.
22
 The unitary state exercised its power through the symbolic 
power of the Greek language and the classical past or through homogenizing and 
centralizing policies. The uniform education system has also assisted the Greek state in 
shaping national identity and assimilating otherness. On the other hand, the Romeic self-
image, the underdog culture and the segmentary society have invariably been associated 
either with the backward or the dangerous other. This otherness threatened cultural 
homogeneity and the authority of the state and therefore had to be suppressed. 
 Although the binary oppositions outlined above are intended to facilitate the 
analysis of the political and cultural developments in Greece since the nineteenth century 
and help account for them in a balanced and detached manner, they do not seem to take 
into account the hierarchy of power involved in those oppositions. The opposing trends 
or self-images are simply presented as being either in constant tension or in some sort of 
fragile equilibrium. None of them appear to dominate or set the agenda for long. 
However, as mentioned above, what is not considered here is the role of the state and its 
contribution to tipping the balance. The dualistic interpretation, therefore, tends to 
overlook the state’s role as a kind of hybrid space between the two poles, where an 
attempt is made to follow western models at the same time as exercising oppressive 
regulation of the underdog culture. The cultural policy of the Greek state was to 
assimilate or even suppress ethnic, regional, cultural and linguistic differences while at 
the same time it fostered a clientelistic system, which attracted large sections of the 
segmentary society by promising individual benefits.  
 This dual role of the state can be held to justify its intermediary position between 
the two poles of the binary patterns proposed. Although it is often pointed out that state-
building in Greece did not live up to western expectations and standards, it is also 
claimed that ‘Greece’s state-building began with a war of independence in 1821 and 
continued along the lines of its Western prototypes – the twentieth-century French 
administration, the German legal system, and British parliamentary practices’.23 Greece 
has been described as ‘one of the earliest late modernizers’ in the sense that it embarked 
                                                          
22
 George T. Mavrogordatos points out that ‘Antivenizelism typically sheltered and expressed the stubborn 
resistance of a variety of particularisms against the modern, liberal, and national state, which aspired to 
control, assimilate, neutralize, or even suppress them’: G. T. Mavrogordatos, Stillborn Republic: Social 
Coalitions and Party Strategies in Greece 1922–1936 (Berkeley 1983) 271. 
23
 J. S. Koliopoulos and Th. M. Veremis, Modern Greece: A History since 1821, 1. Nicos Alivizatos claims 
that during the Greek War of Independence the most conservative strata of Greek society adopted 
principles contained in the most progressive constitutions in Europe: N. C. Alivizatos, ‘The contribution of 
modern Greece to today’s European identity’, The MGSA Bulletin 35 (2003) 21. 
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unusually early on its modernization drive.
24
  State-building, therefore, seems to have 
followed an ambivalent process of development by being both western and non-western 
and carving out a space between conformity to the notion of the individual rights of 
western civil societies and loyalty to the extended family (segmentary society). This 
complicates the binary oppositions outlined above because the state is seen to act not as a 
modernizing but as a homogenizing and centralizing force. Although the Greek state has 
undergone rudimentary modernization and institutional reform over the years, its role in 
suppressing various manifestations of the underdog culture remained largely unchanged 
until the 1980s.  
 In the past, the state was perceived more in adversarial terms and less as a source 
of social security or employment. This antagonistic perception has become more nuanced 
since 1981 and in some cases the balance has even been reversed, while European Union 
subsidies have reinforced the perception of the state as provider.
25
 A ‘culture of 
entitlement’ and a desire to extract compensation for the poverty and material deprivation 
that followed World War II developed. Complaints about state inefficiency were 
combined with an expectation that the state would provide jobs for life and handsome 
pensions. However, the expansion of the state was not accompanied by the development 
of a proper welfare system. During the post-junta period, instead of the state being 
liberalized and its grip on power being loosened, there was simply an exchange of roles 
in exercising authority. In this respect, the state was treated in a contradictory way – both 
as provider and opponent.
26
  
    Over time the Greek state, that reluctant agent of modernization, has been 
replaced by the EU and more recently by the so-called Troika (International Monetary 
Fund, European Central Bank and European Commission) with the task of reforming 
Greece and its economy. However, integration in Europe or the implementation of the 
recent economic adjustment programme may not be enough to ensure the swan-song of 
                                                          
24
 S. N. Kalyvas, Modern Greece: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford 2015) 197. 
25
 Perhaps the perception of the state changed with the rise of PASOK to power in 1981, when state 
mechanisms were taken over by the party: K. Kostis, ‘Τα κακομαθημένα παιδιά της Ιστορίας’: Η 
διαμόρφωση του νεοελληνικού κράτους, 18ος–21ος αιώνας (Athens 2013) 812. 
26
 The following observation sums up the peculiar role of the state in Greece: ‘The size of the state by 
conventional metrics is about average for a European country, but its influence on the incomes of private 
households, and especially of the middle class, is extraordinary. Whereas in northern Europe states 
typically provide public services for all and a safety net for the most needy, in Greece a major function of 
the state is to provide, or to support, the incomes of middle-class occupational groups, during their working 
age’: A. Doxiadis and M. Matsaganis, National Populism and Xenophobia in Greece (London 2012) 40: 
http://counterpoint.uk.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/507_CP_RRadical_Greece_web-1.pdf (accessed 
26 July 2016). It is interesting to note that the term used in Greek is ‘κρατικοποιώ’ (bring [an industry] 
under state ownership) rather than ‘εθνικοποιώ’, the literal equivalent of the English verb ‘to nationalize’. 
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the underdog culture. It has even been argued that, although EU membership may have 
brought Greece politically closer to the European institutions, it has further distanced the 
country from Europe in cultural terms.
27
 It could be said that the crisis has increased 
cultural ambivalence among Greeks and contributed to the somewhat surprising situation 
in which ‘the decline in general EU support is accompanied by an increase in support for 
the euro’.28 Even the referendum of 5 July 2015, seen by many as a test of the country’s 
European identity, once again intensified debates about Europe.  
    Previous studies have emphasized the political role of the modernizing culture, 
while underestimating the cultural dimension of the underdog culture. The latter is not 
simply associated with backwardness or vested interests, but also with forms of social 
exclusion and cultural otherness. One of the problems with the concepts of the underdog 
culture and the segmentary society is that it is assumed that both remained static and 
undeveloped for centuries.
29
 In post-junta Greece, however, these categories can be said 
to have expanded to include different, and even apparently incompatible, groups of 
people: intellectuals, minorities or anti-establishment activists. For the first time, for 
example, the anti-western trend even found rigorous intellectual support from academics 
and philosophers, including Christos Yannaras, Yorgos Kontogiorgis, Kostas Zouraris, 
and Dimitris Kitsikis. One could also query whether the ideological supremacy of the 
Left after the military dictatorship was connected to the ascendancy of the underdog 
culture, the legitimization of otherness and the emancipation of anti-establishment 
forces.
30
  
                                                          
27
 T. Theodoropoulos, P. Mandravelis, P. Markaris, and V. Papavasileiou, Υπό το μηδέν: Tέσσερα σχόλια 
για την κρίση (Athens 2010) 56. 
28
 B. Clements, K. Nanou, and S. Verney, ‘“We no longer love you, but we don’t want to leave you”: The 
eurozone crisis and popular Euroscepticism in Greece’, Journal of European Integration 36 (2014) 263. 
29
 Nicolas Demertzis criticizes ‘cultural dualism’ for treating ‘tradition and modernity as two pre-
constituted and mutually exclusive rather than inter-constituted and interrelated cultural entities’. Instead, 
he proposes ‘inverted syncretism’ as ‘a category designed to deal more accurately with the articulation of 
modernity and tradition in Greek political cultures’ and the ways ‘modernizing patterns lost their original 
function while traditional ones remained intact or even became rejuvenated’: ‘Greece’, in R. Eatwell (ed.), 
European Political Cultures: Conflict or Convergence? (London 1997) 119, and I. D. Stefanidis, Stirring 
the Greek Nation: Political Culture, Irredentism and Anti-Americanism in Post-War Greece, 1945-1967 
(Aldershot 2007) 6–11.  
30
 With reference to the Greek Civil War and the return of the repressed left/other, G. T. Mavrogordatos has 
used the phrase ‘the revenge (revanche) of the vanquished’ to suggest that since 1981 history has been 
rewritten from the point of view of the defeated during the civil strife: ‘Η “ρεβάνς” των ηττημένων’, To 
Vima, 17 October 1999, available at http://www.tovima.gr/opinions/article/?aid=115282). Kostis Kornetis 
also writes about the ‘triumph of the Left in the realm of memory’, and particularly in the area of cinema: 
‘From reconciliation to vengeance: The Greek Civil War on screen in Pantelis Voulgaris’ A Soul So Deep 
and Kostas Charalambous’ Tied Red Thread’, Filmicon: Journal of Greek Film Studies 2 (September 2014) 
98. 
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    After 1974 the underdog culture emerged not as a parochial culture but as an 
agent of the repressed other and a challenge to high culture (as seen in the second part of 
this article). The empowerment of the repressed other (political, social, ethnic or 
linguistic) turned the underdog culture into a broader, and increasingly powerful, 
coalition of anti-systemic forces. Two popular albums by Manolis Rasoulis and Nikos 
Xydakis, Η εκδίκηση της γυφτιάς [The Revenge of the Gypsies] (1978) and Δήθεν 
[Pretentious] (1979) can be seen as an attempt to give a voice to the underdog culture 
through music and song. It was not until after 1974 that the centralizing culture first 
acknowledged the underdog culture, when, for example, the word ‘decentralization’ 
(αποκέντρωση) became de rigueur and attention was turned to the provinces. A sign of 
cultural decentralization was the creation in 1984 of the Municipal Regional Theatres 
(ΔΗΠΕΘΕ) by the then Minister of Culture Melina Mercouri. Even the culturally 
pejorative term ‘province’ (επαρχία) was avoided in favour of the rather more neutral 
‘region’ (περιφέρεια).  
     It has been argued that urbanization did not involve the same transformation of 
Gemeinschaft into Gesellschaft in Greece as in Britain or Germany.
31
 Instead of the 
breakdown of traditional kin and village networks and their replacement by a modern 
division of labour, there was a wholesale transfer of the Gemeinschaft into an urban 
environment with the consequent survival of traditional patron-client relationships. This 
transfer had been completed by the fall of the junta in 1974, while the increasing 
urbanization of villagers entailed a process of cultural homogenization.
32
 However, 
towards the end of the twentieth century, this process started to be questioned from below 
by an explosion of cultural difference and diversity, which seriously undermined the 
notion of monoculturalism and the idea of a dominant monolithic high culture.
33
 Firstly, 
after 1981, it involved the empowerment of rural or previously unprivileged social strata, 
who for the first time felt that they had a voice and could exercise some influence thanks 
to political and cultural changes. Secondly, the influx of migrants and various debates 
and controversies over minorities in Greece, as well as the rehabilitation of the Balkan 
and Ottoman pasts, led to changing attitudes towards otherness and regional difference.  
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 F. Fukuyama, ‘The two Europes’, The American Interest, 8 May 2012: http://www.the-american-
interest.com/2012/05/08/the-two-europes/ (accessed 3 April 2016). 
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 It should be noted that since 1974 cultural associations (πολιτιστικοί/μορφωτικοί σύλλογοι) have 
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11 
 
11 
 
    Although one might have expected that otherness would find support among 
those who promoted the modernizing culture paradoxically it has mostly been associated 
with the underdog culture, whereas the modernizing culture, relying on state authority, 
has sometimes been tainted with authoritarianism. After years of authoritarian practices 
the unshackling of otherness created a cultural and intellectual climate in which it was 
difficult for the modernizing culture (even in the form of the EU) to stage a comeback.
34
 
The often patronizing, top-down practices of the modernizing culture, supported by the 
state, created a mentality of resistance and disobedience among representatives of the 
underdog culture, which tends to be egalitarian.
35
 
    Before the crisis, Greek society relied heavily on the state for employment and for 
funding cultural activities and projects (e.g. films subsidized by the Greek Film Centre). 
As a result the neologism κρατικοδίαιτος (state-nourished) was coined. However, in a 
way the crisis has contributed to the detachment of people from the anchor of the state by 
undermining their perception of it as a secure provider and challenging the deep-seated 
statist mentality. People gradually lost faith in the state’s accountability and its capacity 
for law enforcement, while the state and its institutions went from being an authoritarian 
agent or job provider to being a target for attack, along with the whole political system. 
The growing mistrust of any government made it very hard for reform of any kind to be 
accepted by the public, who increasingly placed their trust in the achievements of the past 
and the myth of national exceptionalism.  
     The tension between the two cultures increased in the last quarter of the twentieth 
century and could be detected in a number of areas, but the outcome of this tension has 
been rather ambiguous. Cultural identity, according to Homi Bhabha, emerges in a 
contradictory and ambivalent ‘Third Space of enunciation’ that makes the claim to a 
hierarchical ‘purity’ of cultures untenable.36 As in post-colonial cultures we might have 
to consider the mutuality and hybridization of these two cultures – although without 
downplaying their oppositionality – in post-authoritarian Greece. It may be useful to 
concentrate on three case studies from different decades of the post-junta period in order 
to demonstrate this tension and raise some questions. 
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 The frequent reference to a ‘colony of debt’ to describe the bailout for the Greek economy suggests that 
the eurozone is seen by many Greeks as a colonizing power. 
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 The historian Nicos Svoronos identified resistance, primarily towards foreign intervention, as a constant 
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 edn 1964). 
36
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 The language reform of 1976, which can serve as the first case in point, poses the 
question as to whether this is a victory of the modernizing or the underdog culture. On 
the one hand, it could be seen as a form of modernization with a beneficial impact on 
education. On the other hand, it could be treated as a rehabilitation of the underdog 
culture and the Romeic trend. It is also interesting to note that some of those who fought 
for the institutionalization of the demotic language resisted the introduction of the 
monotonic system in the early 1980s and agonized over the lexical poverty of the young 
or the general decline in linguistic standards. Secondly, the liberalization of the Greek 
media after 1989 could similarly be considered a sign of a modernizing pluralism, as well 
as offering a platform of expression to the popular, underdog culture and promoting a star 
system. The state media were generally viewed as being controlled by the government 
and their programmes were seen as boring, although this assessment was later revised to 
some extent when their quality came to be compared with the popular shows of the 
commercial media. The third case concerns religion and the controversy over identity 
cards in 2000–1. Although the outcome of this controversy has been hailed as a victory 
for the reformist and western-oriented culture (perhaps the first in this area since the 
declaration of the autocephalous status of the Greek Church in 1833), at the same time 
the presence of the Church in the media and elsewhere has grown exponentially.
37
 It has 
become commonplace to find bishops writing in newspapers, interviewed in the media or 
expressing the Church’s opposition to non-traditional practices (e.g. cremation, reform of 
religious teaching in schools, introduction of Islamic Studies), thus confirming the 
increasingly influential role of Orthodox religion in Greek society.
38
 These three cases 
demonstrate that since 1974 the tension between the modernizing and the underdog 
culture has been more ambivalent than ever before. They also show that the underdog 
culture, along with otherness, gained in strength rather than losing influence, fostering 
some ambiguous or interstitial spaces in the syncretic encounter between the two 
cultures. Just as the post-colonial identity emerges in the ambivalent spaces of the 
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 On the politicization of Christian Orthodox discourse following the decision of the Greek government to 
exclude any reference to religion from identity cards, see Y. Stavrakakis, ‘Religious populism and political 
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colonial encounter, similarly the strengthening of the underdog culture suggests that 
change in post-junta Greece is not in one direction alone but rather multi-directional and 
transcultural, involving an increasingly fluctuating relationship, interaction and tension 
between the two cultures by comparison with the earlier periods. 
 A similar type of ambivalence can be traced in a recent study on the crisis in 
which modernization is defined as ‘a mechanistic importation of western models without 
consideration of anthropological differences’, although the conventions and values 
supporting the Greek economy and polity are recognized as differing from those of the 
West.
39
 It is argued that identities and social bonds in Greece are based on family, friends 
and the community, creating a non-western ‘social ethos.’ This ‘Greek ethos’ has been 
considered the primary target of the austerity measures, but its status seems ambiguous, 
apparently coming close to the notion of the underdog culture. Douzinas claims that, 
although in its corrupted version this ethos promotes neo-liberalism, it is at the same time 
the most powerful force for resisting it. Yet there is no explanation as to how the Greek 
ethos, ‘with its mild nationalism, secular religiosity and familial base’ and its presumed 
resistance to westernization, performs this double act.
40
  
 The interpretation of the economic crisis as being the result of insufficient 
modernization has often been questioned by Liakos and others,
41
 and indeed such an 
approach cannot easily be applied to developments in Greek culture. Alternatively, 
Greeks are presented as having to cope with the conflicting tensions resulting from a 
fusion of dated and modern practices. For example, the mass media in Greece are 
considered modern in form and technology but outmoded in content, while in the social 
sphere the Greek nuclear family embodies competing ‘archaic’ and modern features.42 
Pulled in different directions, Greeks appear to walk a tightrope stretched between 
archaic institutions and structures and modern aspirations and lifestyles. It should be 
evident by now that the theory of cultural dualism tends to obscure ambivalence and 
hybridizations, which in turn leads to treating the state both as a source of secure 
employment (a survival of the earlier clientelist mentality) and as an adversary (a result 
of the increasingly anti-systemic discourse of the underdog culture). It seems that during 
the crisis this ambivalent attitude towards the state has been extended to the EU, leading 
                                                          
39
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 A. Liakos, Η επιστροφή της κοκκινοσκουφίτσας (Athens 2014) 68–83. 
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to its being considered as both saviour and enemy, and thus suggesting that the crisis has 
simultaneously strengthened and profoundly undermined the authority of the 
modernizing discourse.  
Having looked at cultural dualism and its limitations as an analytical tool in 
accounting for the belated or incomplete modernization of Greece, I will now explore 
how the tension between two competing notions of culture intensified in post-junta 
Greece and further complicated the hierarchies involved in the dualist approaches. This 
was partly due to the confluence of the anti-western underdog culture and the ascendancy 
of a westernized consumerist culture as will be seen in the next section. 
 
Greek culture between humanism and consumerism 
 
The dualist approaches to Greek culture and politics discussed above gained additional 
momentum by increasingly opposing notions of culture during the post-junta period. The 
growing social diversity, the increased visibility of various minorities and the striking 
improvements in living standards in Greece at the end of the twentieth and the beginning 
of the twenty-first century challenged the notion of culture as an autonomous and 
homogeneous realm and created the conditions for cultural debates similar to those that 
had arisen in other western societies, and particularly in Britain, decades earlier.  
     Τhese involved F. R. Leavis and T. S. Eliot, who exemplified an idealistic and 
highly selective tradition of cultural criticism, and Raymond Williams and others, whose 
more materialistic approach envisioned culture as always ‘ordinary’.43 For Leavis and 
Eliot culture linked different individuals in an ‘organic community’, built around 
historical continuity and tradition. This notion of an organic national culture was seen as 
being threatened in the modern mass society by technology and popular entertainment, 
which eroded its cohesion and its high standards.  Williams, on the other hand, saw 
culture as ‘a whole way of life’ and not in selective terms. During the twentieth century, 
the debate in England about the meaning of culture was largely informed by ‘the 
distinction, established by nineteenth-century writers such as Matthew Arnold and John 
Ruskin, between culture as a realm of ideal values (nobility of purpose, beauty of forms) 
and the non-culture of an industrial society increasingly defined as mechanical and 
dehumanised’.44  
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    The fact that recent Greek cultural trends present certain similarities with earlier 
cultural debates and transitions in England is not a matter of belatedness but of social 
developments leading to a more pronounced distinction between high and low culture. 
Over the years, high culture, associated with universalism and absolutism, has become 
part of the problem rather than part of the solution. The perception of culture as art and 
civility gave way to the perception of culture as lifestyle and identity politics, 
highlighting the tension between making and being made. As Terry Eagleton points out, 
‘culture as spirituality is eroded by culture as the commodity, to give birth to culture as 
identity’.45 Although it is hard to see cultural values as not being bound up with those of 
everyday life, one could argue that two broad notions of culture have driven the cultural 
impulse in Greece since 1974: the humanist or elitist definition of culture (the best of 
everything) and the anthropological or lifestyle perception of culture as primarily a way 
of life and identity.   
 The earlier humanist conception of culture presupposes canonization and 
hierarchy, with high culture taking precedence over popular culture or subcultures. The 
modern conception of culture as lifestyle involves plurality and choice, leading in turn to 
individualization and the challenging of the idea of society as a cohesive and collective 
body. In this case, society is perceived as a collection of individuals with changing 
personal tastes, identities and lifestyles. The humanist conception of culture promotes an 
allegiance to a set of spiritual values, ideas and works of art, whereas the conception of 
culture as diverse ways of life promotes individual lifestyles and personal choices, which 
often override community values and humanist principles. The rise in Greece of the latter 
form of culture led to the rise of individualism, something previously unknown to Greek 
society, a feature widely recognized by analysts as being a key feature of the period since 
1980.
46
 It could be said that humanist culture works top-down and tends to look to the 
past, whereas the conception of culture as lifestyle is more forward-looking and prone to 
differentiation, developing in various directions across the board. This conception also 
fosters a proliferation of audiences, communities of readers or spectators.
 47
 Humanist 
culture tends to rely more on tradition, heritage and ideal standards, whereas lifestyle 
culture relies on conditions that can become dated or obsolete more quickly due to 
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advances in living standards, social mobility, technology and modes of communication or 
entertainment. 
     The apparent polarization in Greek culture between elitist aestheticism and 
hedonistic consumerism can be seen as corresponding to the disjunction between 
humanist/high and lifestyle/popular culture. Of course, tensions between high and 
popular culture can be traced even farther back, but it was at the end of the twentieth 
century that the representatives of high culture first felt seriously threatened by popular 
culture and the postmodern celebration of consumerism, hedonism and style. 
     As a consequence of postmodernism and the fusion of styles, it became more 
difficult in a number of western countries to maintain a meaningful distinction between 
art and popular culture. Whereas the boundaries between the two were not so apparent in 
Greece earlier,
48
 since the 1980s there has been an attempt to draw a clear line between 
them and, above all, high culture has felt itself to be under attack. This was partly due to 
the fact that the earlier left-wing rejection of the ‘American way of life’, which was 
discarded as fake or a form of cultural imperialism, in favour of an authentic popular 
Greek culture, no longer held sway, resulting in a reversal of earlier taxonomies and 
changing the cultural landscape in Greece. The earlier, politically driven, distinction 
between the authentic ‘Greek tradition’ and the ‘American way of life’ gradually gave 
way to a depoliticized, broader opposition between high and popular culture or led to the 
paradox that the folk tradition was venerated and yet at the same time anything defined as 
folkloric or ethographic (ηθογραφικό) was downplayed or even rejected.49 
 This was evident in a book on Greek kitsch published in 1984, where the negative 
association of popular culture with the anti-aesthetic is made explicit.
50
 The volume 
includes articles by contemporary art historians, literary critics, anthropologists, 
musicians, and intellectuals, as well as historical texts by Periklis Yannopoulos and 
Dimitris Pikionis. It was richly illustrated with photographs of buildings (exteriors and 
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interiors), cars, advertisements, social events, pages from newspapers, film stills and 
other pictures, which purported to show Greek bad taste. Kitsch was presented as an 
epidemic spreading through Greek society and signifying a decline in the quality of 
Greek life. Conceived as an attack on the anti-aesthetic in Greece, this volume articulates 
a nostalgia for some sort of vanishing popular authenticity and the purity of the Greek 
landscape. It also represents a reflection on Greek identity, judging from the references to 
the ‘face of Greece’ and a resistance to commercialization and consumerism, as implied 
in the foreword written by the then Greek minister of culture Melina Mercouri and other 
contributions. In short, the volume tries to record a ‘fake’, urban or semi-urban, popular 
culture, as opposed to an earlier genuine folk culture, which raises the question whether 
the volume was merely a study of popular forms of expression or an attempt to correct 
and improve the aesthetics of popular culture.
51
  
 Conversely, the pejorative neologism koultouriaris, assigned to intellectuals and 
artists in the 1980s, can be seen as a kind of response to this corrective aspiration and a 
sign of confidence in the popular, consumerist culture. The first Greek lifestyle magazine 
Klik (Click) began to be published in 1987 and marked a new era for journalism, 
sexuality and popular culture. The following year Dick Hebdige’s book on subculture 
was translated into Greek, indicating a growing interest in cultural diversity. Narcissistic 
individualism and the search for an ‘authentic self’ coexisted with new forms of social 
intimacy and crowd rituals (open-air concerts, beach parties, football celebrations and 
mass demonstrations).  
 The difference between the humanist and consumerist cultures was manifested 
mainly in areas which had opened up to commercialization rather belatedly, such as the 
book trade and the media. Music and film had become commercial much earlier, but even 
in those areas it was in the 1980s that the flourishing of the so-called skyladika
52
, new 
modes of entertainment (e.g. watching videos) and the frequent screenings of popular 
films on Greek television contributed to a further accentuation of cultural divisions. 
Meanwhile, under the directorship of Manos Hatzidakis from 1975 to 1981, the Greek 
Radio’s Third Programme promoted qualitative distinctions and tried to redefine cultural 
boundaries.  Hatzidakis’ standoff with the newspaper Avriani in 1987 and the so-called 
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Avrianismos are indicative of the cultural polarization that was developing during the 
1980s. From the early 1970s onwards, youth became a less vague cultural category; new 
subcultures and youth slangs developed, school uniforms were abolished and students’ 
customary leisure activities (frappé, backgammon and television, together with a taste for 
rebetika and old partisan songs) gradually changed.
53
 The emergent combination of 
consumerism and radical humanism could not be sustained for long and broke down 
during the crisis, fostering a culture of resistance, disobedience and radicalization.  
 In order to better understand cultural developments in Greece, we need to delve 
into the ways concepts such as the ‘popular’ (λαϊκό) have been used over the years. In the 
past, ‘popular’ was defined either in linguistic terms (demotic vs. formal/archaic) or by 
the mode of production (collective/individual) or it had class connotations with reference 
to marginal or proletarian cultural production. After 1974, and more particularly after 
1981 (with the rise of PASOK to power), the words ‘people’ (λαός) and ‘popular’ (λαϊκό) 
became overused, albeit in ways that their meaning was hard to pin down. The settling of 
the language question in 1976 and increasing social mobility made the earlier uses of the 
term ‘popular’ more or less obsolete.  
    With the emergence of consumer culture in Greece the popular was increasingly 
associated with material culture, lifestyles and light entertainment (for example, a revival 
of interest in the Greek cinema of the 1950s to the early 1970s), in opposition to high 
culture. There has been a move away from the Marxist model of popular culture (with the 
focus on production) to a more Weberian model (with the focus on consumption).
54
 The 
popular has to a large extent lost its earlier association with authenticity and has come to 
be judged aesthetically or ethically.
55
 In a way, the popular, associated with consumerism 
and lifestyle, has assumed the position previously reserved for the ‘other’ by the elitist 
culture. It could be argued that the negativity associated with otherness and underdog 
                                                          
53
 See N. Papadogiannis, Militant Around the Clock? Left-Wing Youth Politics, Leisure, and Sexuality in 
Post-Dictatorship Greece 1974–1981 (New York and Oxford 2015). The number of students in higher 
education increased considerably during the post-junta period. From less than 30,000 in 1960, their 
numbers more than doubled by 1971–2 (70,161) and continued to rise till 1981–2 (87,476) and the 
subsequent years (111,911 by 1991–2): D. Charalambis, L. Maratou-Alipranti, and A. Hadjiyanni (eds) 
Recent Social Trends in Greece 1960–2000 (Quebec 2004) 584. It should be noted that these figures do not 
include those studying abroad whose numbers increased rapidly from 9,985 in 1970 to 41,086 in 1981. 
54
 H. N. Parker, ‘Toward a definition of popular culture’, History and Theory 50 (2011) 158. 
55
 Adopting a Marxist perspective, Yorgos Veloudis argues that there are two kinds of ‘popular’ literature: 
the old, associated with rural communities and the demotic, and the new, associated with urbanism and so-
called ‘para-literature’. The former originates from the people and is a primary form of popular literature 
while the latter is written for the people and is a secondary form of popular literature. In the first case 
producer and consumer are identical, whereas in the second they are distinct: ‘“Λόγια” και “λαϊκή” 
λογοτεχνία’, in Y. Veloudis, Ψηφίδες: Για μια θεωρία της λογοτεχνίας (Athens 1992) 57.  
19 
 
19 
 
culture has been transferred to the notion of the popular and the related phenomenon of 
populism, which has manifested itself primarily in the area of politics, but which has 
wider ramifications. The redefinition of the popular accentuated the distinction between 
popular and high culture in Greece, which has become all the more evident in the area of 
literature. 
 The novel by Alexandros Kotzias Φανταστική περιπέτεια (1985) was the first to 
deal with culture as a state institution and produce a grotesque caricature of literary 
kitsch.
56
 Although the novel focuses on the events of a single day (tellingly 21 April 
1983), it deals with the emergence and collapse of a literary bubble and the rise and fall 
of a megalomaniac narcissist, aspiring to capture the ethos of the post-junta period and 
chart its cultural trends. Alexandros Kapandais, the book’s main character, personifies, as 
a writer and high-ranking civil servant, corruption, self-promotion and the abuse of 
power. His career also exemplifies the role of public relations in literary careers and the 
dominance of pompous junk literature in 1980s Greece and its connections with state 
institutions. The cynical Kapandais had managed to become a fake literary celebrity and 
has received a number of awards in Greece and abroad while making scornful remarks 
about established writers such as the ‘pervert’ Cavafy, the ‘charlatan’ Seferis or the 
‘opportunistic’ Tsirkas. Thus, the novel highlights the widening gap between trash and 
highbrow literature due to the increasing institutionalization of culture and its 
exploitation by figures such as Kapandais, who even managed to have his own 
biographer.  
 The novel has been seen as a fictional caricature of the state of affairs that led 
Greece into the crisis and perhaps for this reason it was reprinted in 2012.
57
 It also aimed 
to demonstrate how state machinery promoted so-called paralogotechnia (‘para-
literature’, i.e. popular or trashy literature), thus suggesting that alongside the earlier 
notion of the ‘para-state’ a similar concept emerged in the cultural arena after the junta. 
In this case, Kotzias was not so much concerned with literature written for a mass 
audience, since this was a later phenomenon in Greece, but was trying to show how 
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opportunists could take advantage of state and party mechanisms in order to promote 
themselves and thus undermine values or blur aesthetic distinctions. Moreover, he 
suggests that para-literature is more of a cultural practice, a kind of subculture, 
increasingly fostered by state institutions during the 1980s.
58
 It should be noted here that 
although a kind of popular literature in Greece could be traced back to the nineteenth 
century,
59
 it was at the end of the twentieth century that it was treated as a serious 
commercial and aesthetic threat to high culture. 
 From the mid-1990s the commercialization of the novel became a feature of the 
production of fiction, and the setting up of the National Book Centre (EKEBI) in 1994 
contributed to the trend that treated literary books as products rather than artefacts, 
applying quantitative criteria in exploring reading patterns and readers’ responses.60 
Greek book production trebled between 1987 (2,348 books) and 2010 (8,900 books) 
while increasing emphasis was placed on promoting and translating them.  Some saw the 
introduction of book supplements by newspapers (To Vima in 1997, Eleftherotypia in 
1998 and Ta Nea in 2002) as a sign of the expansion of the reading public and others as a 
confirmation of the increasing commercialization of the book market, a sense reinforced 
by the coining of the term ‘τα ευπώλητα’ for best-selling books. A shift seems to have 
taken place in publishing from literariness and aesthetic appreciation to cultural 
consumerism, something which has been met with vociferous opposition from the literati.  
 The rise of popular culture since the 1980s has fostered an explosion in the 
production of popular novels in Greece, and this may have led to the decline of the short 
story, which had previously dominated Greek prose fiction, although it has shown signs 
of recovery during the crisis.
61
 In the last thirty years, the term paralogotechnia  has 
become increasingly familiar, while popular culture in Greece has been associated with 
two types of fiction: best-selling novels primarily addressed to and enjoyed by a female 
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audience
62
 and works which were seen in the 1980s as promoting individualism, 
consumerism and the emerging media culture.
63
 Both types of fiction, relying on simple 
storytelling and shunning formal experimentation, became increasingly associated with 
popular literature, and crime fiction went from being a neglected and somewhat despised 
genre to becoming accepted as one of the most effective methods of engaging with 
contemporary social problems.  For many years crime fiction in Greece was considered a 
form of pulp fiction, but since the 1990s its reputation has been significantly enhanced 
and the leading crime writer, Petros Markaris, has written a number of detective novels 
depicting Greek society in crisis. Also, the recent rehabilitation of the crime fiction of 
Yannis Maris has been seen as a legitimization of popular culture in Greece.
 64
 
 Perhaps the regression in terms of narrative experimentation has to do with a 
reversal in the trend for subordinating function, promoted by the ‘popular aesthetic’, to 
form, favoured by the ‘pure’ aesthetic gaze.65 High culture is about representation and 
contemplation; popular culture is about performance and what is represented, in other 
words the affirmation of the continuity between art and life. As Bourdieu has stated, 
‘intellectuals could be said to believe in the representation – literature, theatre, painting 
— more than in the things represented, whereas the people chiefly expect representations 
and the conventions which govern them to allow them to believe “naively” in the things 
represented’.66 An elective ‘aesthetic distance’, to use Bourdieu’s term, has been 
developed, while at the same time the detachment of the pure gaze has been challenged. 
The primacy of form over function, of manner over matter, has increasingly been 
questioned. As a reaction to this, those who defend the autonomy of literature and the 
seriousness of high culture have deplored the demise of poetry or tried to rescue fiction 
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from the perils of facile storytelling by promoting experimentation, self-referentiality or 
the hybridization of essay and fiction.
67
 
 In cinema the distinction between elitist and popular culture can be understood by 
comparing the aesthetic, existential and eclectic approach to the Balkans in Theo 
Angelopoulos’ Ulysses’ Gaze (1995) with the popular and stereotypical perception of the 
area portrayed in the road movie Balkanisateur (1997) by Sotiris Gkoritsas.  The elegiac 
and highbrow pessimism of Angelopoulos contrasts with the cheeky, jocular tone of 
Gkoritsas’ film. In Ulysses’ Gaze the characters are crossing the Balkans, searching for 
the meaning of history and identity, whereas in the Balkanisateur they are driven by the 
desire to make easy money through a currency scam. The distinction between elite and 
popular culture is also translated into performances of antiquity and modernity, as was 
the case with the opening and closing ceremonies of the 2004 Olympic Games. The 
opening ceremony highlighted antiquity by projecting cultural and historical continuity 
and playing to the expectations of foreign audiences. The closing ceremony celebrated 
traditional music and dance and showcased popular culture.  
 Although the distinction between a humanist and a lifestyle conception of culture 
might offer useful insights into recent cultural trends, there are some areas in which this 
dualistic pattern seems to break down.
68
 Music and song, where the distinction between 
popular (λαϊκό) and high popular (έντεχνο λαϊκό) has been highlighted and debated for a 
long time (following the rehabilitation of rebetika and poetry set to music), could be 
considered as such an area. However, this kind of distinction could be challenged by the 
extensive hybridization of styles and the number of established poets who have written 
lyrics for popular songs.
69
 It is not only earlier poets such as Gatsos and Leivaditis who 
have made their mark (and living) by writing popular lyrics, but contemporary ones as 
well (for example, Manos Eleftheriou and Michalis Ganas). It should also be noted that 
during the crisis street and hip-hop artists have increasingly blended elements from 
popular and elite culture. 
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 More than other artists, poets faced the predicament of choosing elitist isolation 
or opening up to the wider public, thus acknowledging the incommensurability of the 
humanist and popular culture and at the same time trying to bridge the gap. Kiki 
Dimoula, a poet who is popular with the public, has been disparagingly described as the 
Harry Potter  of Greek poetry
70
 and a media phenomenon,
71
 while other poets such as 
Ganas have managed to transcend poetry’s isolation and lack of rapport with the public 
by reconciling the elitism of poetry with the popularity of song, the urban with the 
regional and individual lyricism with collective memories.
72
 In the last twenty years 
some poets and critics have lamented the mass production of unsophisticated poetry and 
its relegation to the status of a self-indulgent hobby.
73
 They seem to hark back to the 
times when poetry in Greece was more engaged with the public and aesthetically 
accountable. The crisis seems to have reversed this downward trend and led to an 
efflorescence of a new kind of poetry associated with what Lambropoulos calls ‘Left 
Melancholy’.74 
 It could be argued that a gradual transition towards cultural materiality is one of 
the main features of the period following the fall of the junta. This can be seen in the 
proliferation of food programmes on Greek television, the growing number of 
publications on cooking (including novels on the theme of cooking and food), the 
increasing emphasis on body care, the first gossipy life-style tabloids and the attempt to 
promote Greek culture not only in terms of its past but also its material present.  A 
characteristic example of this trend is a video entitled ‘Be one of us’ (2013) by the 
students of the ‘Tabula Rasa’ School of Arts, which aims to promote Greece and its 
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culture.
75
 In this video images of Zorba and the Acropolis are replaced by sensory 
experience, food and the communal way of life.   
    Yet the crisis has spawned a new kind of humanism, based on the axiom that 
people matter more than numbers and statistics, calling for a rediscovery of human 
solidarity against consumerist individualism and neo-liberal austerity.
76
 There is now a 
growing emphasis on the role of local communities and public space in an attempt to 
revive the sense of a spirit of human interaction among ordinary people that has been to 
some extent lost. The crisis has questioned the individualistic narcissism and the lifestyle 
culture of recent years, making the cultural ambivalence even more intense by inviting a 
rethink of the two dreams of the metapolitefsi: modernization and consumerism.  
 
Conclusion 
Between the fall of the junta and the onset of the crisis, Greece enjoyed its longest period 
of democracy and prosperity, and many institutional reforms have come primarily from 
the EU following a top-down approach. What I hope to have shown in this article is that 
by contrast, in the area of culture, we can see a bottom-up approach with an increasing 
prominence of materiality, diversity, otherness, popular culture and anti-systemic forces. 
This has meant that cultural differences are now more widely tolerated and accepted than 
ever before, thus calling into question the notion of a homogeneous national culture. For 
Greece this has been particularly challenging, as for many years it had endeavoured to 
promote national homogenization and cultural assimilation.
77
  
    Although modernization and Europeanization were valorized by dualist 
approaches, the ascendancy of a diverse underdog culture, fostered by the undermining of 
the hierarchical distinctions between high and low, has not received proper attention 
despite its earlier vociferous manifestations and despite the fact that it has become a 
culture of resistance during the crisis.
 78
 The period from junta to crisis can be read as the 
story of two cultures and an era of increasing cultural tension and diversity, making it a 
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testing ground for established models of analysis and one of the most dynamic periods of 
Greek culture. Interestingly, however, the underdog culture has been seen as largely anti-
western, whereas consumerist culture is seen as westernized, thus challenging neat 
oppositions and highlighting once again hybridizations and tensions in Greek culture. 
Interrogating dualist interpretations and analysing cultural oppositions offers an 
opportunity to revisit the two main features of the culture of metapolitefsi (modernization 
and consumerism) and ask probing questions in the light of the current crisis. 
